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Contractual Indescendibility
David Horton*
Testation is supposed to be comprehensive: when we die, we pass everything we own to
our friends and family. However, a growing number of valuable things defy this
principle. From frequent flyer miles to virtual property to e-mail and social media
accounts, some assets expressly state that they cannot be transmitted by will, trust, or
intestacy. This invited contribution to the Hastings Law Journal Symposium in honor of
Charles L. Knapp analyzes this trend, which I call “contractual indescendibility.” It
shows that consumers who challenge noninheritability provisions face three obstacles.
First, they have to prove an ownership interest in the item. Second, they need to invalidate
the indescendibility clause under contract law. And third, they must navigate the gauntlet
of federal legislation that governs this area. Despite these hurdles, I conclude that
companies should not have carte blanche to delete this cherished stick from the bundle of
rights.

* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
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Introduction
Like many professionals, Ken Means, an engineer from Texas,
1
spends too much time on the road. He has accumulated 650,000 frequent
2
flyer miles and hotel rewards points. Thus, when Ken made a will, he
treated his loyalty credits like everything else that belonged to him, and
3
left them to his wife. Yet Ken probably attempted to exercise a property
right that does not exist. Buried in the terms and conditions of Ken’s
memberships is likely a clause that makes his points indescendible—
nontransferable by will, trust, or intestacy.
This phenomenon, which I call “contractual indescendibility,” is
4
quietly becoming a flashpoint in the adhesion contract war. It is the
product of several different trends. The first is the rise of assets that
straddle the border between contract and property. Americans place an
increasing amount of pecuniary and psychological value on frequent flyer
1. See Gary Stoller, What Happens to Frequent-Flier Miles If You Die?, U.S.A. Today (Sept. 1,
2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/09/01/deceased-travelers-frequentflyer-points/2749761.
2. See id.
3. See id. For an anecdotal account of an estate planner who directs clients to address frequent flyer
miles in their wills, see Susan Stellin, The Afterlife of Your Frequent Flier Miles, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/travel/the-afterlife-of-your-frequent-flier-miles.html.
4. I briefly address contractual indescendibility in David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 Calif. L.
Rev. 543, 56570, 59799 (2014). This Article expands on my analysis there. In addition, for a similar
piece that appeared while this Article was in the editing stage, see generally Natalie M. Banta, Inherit
the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death,
83 Fordham L. Rev. 799 (2014).
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miles, video game winnings, e-mails, and uploads to social media accounts.
For example, a 2011 survey of the United States found over two billion
6
rewards program members holding $48 billion in points. Similarly,
security software vendor McAfee recently estimated that consumers
7
have amassed an average of $55,000 in digital assets, and the gross
domestic product of virtual universe Second Life is roughly $600 million,
8
which places it among the top twenty-five nations in the world. The
companies that create this newest of “new property” are taking pains to
liberate themselves from the cost and hassle of complying with their
9
customers’ testamentary wishes.
Contractual indescendibility also reflects the creeping privatization
of inheritance. Once, estate planning meant executing a will, a single
instrument that passed through probate and disposed of all of a
decedent’s possessions. Today, most middle and upper class individuals
attempt to avoid court-based succession by using contract-like devices.
Indeed, they hold vast reservoirs of wealth in pensions, life insurance,
5. The ascent of frequent flyer miles and their ilk is a minor part of much larger changes in the
nature of the economy. Land, once the fount of social power, has been eclipsed by paper assets such as
stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1119 (1984).
6. See Tim Winship, Airline Frequent Flyer Miles, 30 Years Later, ABC News (May 25, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/airline-frequent-flyer-miles-30- years/story?id=13616082.
7. McAfee Reveals Average Internet User Has More than $37,000 in Unprotected ‘Digital Assets’,
McAfee (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2011/q3/20110927-01.aspx. McAfee,
which sells security software to protect these supposedly cherished digital assets, stands to gain from
making this figure as high as possible. Id.
8. See Peter Diamandis, Second Life: How a Virtual World Became a Reality, Huffington Post
(Mar. 7, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-diamandis/second-life-how-a-virtual_b_
2831270.html; see also GDP (Current U.S. $), World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited May 10, 2015).
9. Sports franchises also make season tickets partially indescendibile: transferable only to certain
people, or for a fee. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 566; Rachael Rustmann, It’s a Brand New
Ballgame: How to Bequest Season Tickets for Your Favorite Sports Team’s Games, 4 Est. Plan. &
Community Prop. L.J. 369, 37375 (2012). For instance, the Green Bay Packers have an elaborate
scheme of preapproved relatives who can inherit season tickets:
We will honor a request for transfer as follows:
a) Upon death of ticket holder
1) To surviving spouse; or if no spouse, the surviving children of a deceased ticket
holder without authorization. (If children do not agree—no transfer.)
2) If direction by deceased under will or specific writing to family devisees defined in
(b) but not to devisees who are not defined in (b), even with direction.
b) To family, defined as, spouse and “blood” relatives who are not more than first
cousins, on direction of ticket holder in writing during his or her life-time. (Excludes, for
example, transfer to friends.)
Season Tickets, Green Bay Packers, http://www.packers.com/tickets/season-tickets.html (last visited
May 10, 2015); see also Associated Press, Brother Sues Brother Over Packers Tickets, Milwaukee-Wis.
J. Sentinel (May 27, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/46286532.html (describing one father’s
ill-fated attempt to pass the right to sell his Packers season tickets to his sons). In the interest of
brevity, I will not discuss personal seat licenses in this Article.
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and pay-on-death accounts. These nonprobate mechanisms allow owners
to name beneficiaries by filling out a form. Contractual indescendibility
is the inverse of this movement, the recognition that, just as private
agreement can facilitate testation, it can deny the right to engage in
testation altogether.
Finally, contractual indescendibility reflects the insatiable ambition
of fine print—a fact that makes it a suitable topic for this invited
symposium contribution to the Hastings Law Journal in honor of Charles
L. Knapp’s fiftieth year of teaching. During his storied career, Chuck has
chronicled how large companies have used adhesive terms to disclaim
warranties, limit their liability, and shunt consumers’ and employees’ claims
11
into distant forums or binding arbitration (or both). Of course, the case
law and commentary on contractual indescendibility will never reach the
epic proportions of the debates to which Chuck has added his resonant
voice. Yet the boilerplate contract that deletes the right to bequeath or
transmit through intestacy is a symptom of the same pathology. As Chuck
has lucidly explained, modern contract law rewards drafters and privileges
12
an instrument’s text. In light of these incentives, it is not surprising that
firms are testing the waters with novel self-serving schemes.
Admittedly, contractual indescendibility will seem unproblematic to
some readers. For starters, loyalty points, virtual property, and digital
media may not even belong to consumers. Unlike land or chattels, these
things exist only because an airline, hotel, rental car agency, credit card
issuer, video game developer, or internet service provider (“ISP”) has
constructed them. Arguably, drafters should be free to exclude particular
stalks from their artificial bouquets of rights. Moreover, the market may
constrain firms. For instance, Yahoo! does not allow the contents of e13
mail accounts to be inherited, but Google will sometimes accommodate
14
a decedent’s wishes. If consumers care about bequeathing their electronic

10. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate
Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 12 (2012) (noting
the prevalence of “financially intermediated account forms that invite nonprobate transfer”).
11. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Cases and Controversies: Some Things to Do with Contracts Cases,
88 Wash. L. Rev. 1357, 1393 (2013); Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553, 561 (2012); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 766 (2002); Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or
Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95, 110
(2006) [hereinafter Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?]; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on
Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609, 627 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?, supra note 11, at 100–03.
13. See Yahoo! Terms of Service, Yahoo!, https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (last
visited May 10, 2015) (“You agree that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to your
Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death.”).
14. See Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased User’s Account, Google, https://support.google.com/
accounts/answer/2842525?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 (last visited May 10, 2015) (setting forth a procedure
for authorized representatives of a deceased user to obtain contents of a deceased user’s account).
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correspondence, perhaps they will vote with their feet and patronize prodescendibility firms. Finally, some businesses can claim that Congress has
given its imprimatur to their indescendibility policies. The Airline
Deregulation Act (“ADA”) grants carriers broad leeway to structure
their affairs without interference from state consumer protection
15
efforts. Similarly, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) bars ISPs
from disclosing a customer’s private digital communications without her
16
consent. Although the SCA’s precise effect on inheritance issues
17
remains hazy, some ISPs have argued that it prevents them from
18
allowing a fiduciary to marshal a decedent’s online assets. These are all
plausible arguments that indescendibility clauses should be enforceable.
Nevertheless, I am more skeptical about these provisions. First, I
explain why consumers should not need to prove that rewards points,
avatars, and e-mails are their “property” for all purposes. Instead, the
benchmark ought to be the narrower issue of whether these things are
descendible. Judges can answer this question by examining whether a
company has given its customers reason to believe that their rights are
transferable. Second, not every indescendibility clause should be valid as
a matter of black-letter contract law. For one, some firms will be unable
to prove that consumers manifested assent to the fine print. In addition,
courts may strike down noninheritability provisions under either the
unconscionability doctrine or the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Third, although the ADA is a formidable obstacle for frequent
flyers who wish to challenge indescendibility clauses, the SCA leaves
room for pro-consumer state regulation.
This Article contains two Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
the rising number of assets that purport to be indescendible. Part II
examines the tripartite legal showing that a consumer must make to
overcome a noninheritability provision: that (1) she has an ownership
interest in the item, (2) the indescendibility clause is not enforceable, and
(3) federal law does not shield the provision.

I. Contractual Indescendibility
Two ideas about inheritance are rarely questioned. The first is that
to acquire something is also to enjoy the privilege to convey it after
death. Indeed, “[i]t is hard for most Americans to imagine a system of
private property that doesn’t include a right to control what happens to their

15. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2015) (barring states from regulating certain aspects of air travel).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2015).
17. Compare Naomi Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1697, 1716–17 (2014)
(arguing that courts can construe the SCA not to preclude fiduciary access to digital assets), with David
Horton, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1729, 1735–36 (2014) (reading
the SCA to permit access only if a user has taken affirmative steps during life to authorize disclosure).
18. See infra Part II.C.2.
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property after death.” The second is that succession is all-encompassing.
Professionally drafted wills and trusts have a residuary clause, which
transmits any item not specifically mentioned to particular beneficiaries.
And even if a decedent omits an asset from her estate plan, the intestacy
scheme will shepherd it to her heirs. Thus, when someone dies, all that is
hers—“every jewel and bauble, every bank account, all stocks and bonds,
the cars and houses, corn futures or gold bullion, all books, CD’s, pictures,
21
and carpets—everything will pass on to somebody or something else.”
But as this Part demonstrates, some valuable things defy these basic
22
propositions. Indeed, companies often exploit their dominion over the
fine print to make items indescendible.
A. Frequent Flyer Miles and Loyalty Points
In 1922, Roscoe Pound noted that paper assets like stocks were
becoming the centerpiece of the economy by declaring that “[w]ealth, in
23
a commercial age, is made up largely of promises.” Today, one might
jest that wealth consists mainly of frequent flyer miles. This Subpart
reveals that the wild popularity of rewards points has spurred many firms
to make them noninheritable.
The first loyalty programs were relatively simple. In the 1970s,
banks had enjoyed success with gimmicks such as giving toasters to their
24
best clients. In May 1981, American Airlines borrowed that model with
25
its AAdvantage initiative. The carrier informed its 190,000 most active
26
flyers that they were entitled to discounted tickets and seat upgrades.
Only six days later, cutthroat competitor United Airlines unveiled a similar
27
plan, Mileage Plus. Within a few years, primitive loyalty programs had
28
sprung up throughout the transportation industry. Yet despite their

19. Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law 57–58 (2010).
20. Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1423, 1424 (2013) (“One way or another,
everything previously owned by a deceased person is going to pass into someone else’s hands.”).
21. Lawrence M. Friedman, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and Inheritance
Law 3 (2009).
22. Another species of indescendibility might be thought of as “pure indescendibility,” things that
are impervious to posthumous transfer even though no contract covers them. See Horton, supra note
4, at 548–65 (discussing noble titles, body parts, and certain causes of action).
23. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 225 (1922).
24. See, e.g., The Big 2-5Celebrating 25 Years of Frequent Flyer Programs, InsideFlyer,
http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/article.php?key=2926 (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter The Big 2-5].
25. See, e.g., History of AMR Corporation and American Airlines, American Airlines,
https://www.aa.com/i18n/amrcorp/corporateInformation/facts/history.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015).
26. See, e.g., The Big 2-5, supra note 24.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., History of Loyalty Programs, FrequentFlier.com, http://www.frequentflier.com/
programs/history-of-loyalty-programs (last visited May 10, 2015) (noting that Delta and TWA christened
frequent flyer programs in 1981, Holiday Inn and Marriott adopted rewards policies in 1983, and National
Rental Car joined the fray in 1987).
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ubiquity, rewards points were little more than glorified coupons. Customers
earned miles and their ilk by travelling, booking a hotel room, or renting
29
a car. They could only redeem credits in similar transactions with the
30
same firm, and they could not transfer points under any circumstances.
But as the decades passed, rewards points mutated into a shadowy
form of wealth. Airlines, hotels, and car rental agencies forged alliances
with non-travel-related entities, such as credit card issuers and phone
31
companies. Thus, points became the valuable residue of engaging in
commercial activity—a kind of interest that accrues from structuring
one’s finances the right way. Indeed, roughly half of the 14 trillion
32
frequent flyer miles in circulation have been earned without setting foot
33
on a plane. The most vociferous consumer of Delta SkyMiles is
34
American Express, which uses them to incentivize its own products.
Likewise, American Airlines sells AAdvantage points to over a thousand
other corporations, meaning that consumers “earn miles for everything
35
from home mortgages to Lasik surgery to buying Gap jeans online.” In
addition, the purchasing power of points expanded dramatically. Rather
than merely being able to trade credits for a companion ticket or an extra
day at a destination, members began to enjoy the power to donate to
36
charities and buy steaks, electronics, and tickets to Broadway shows.
For these reasons, a 2002 article in The Economist proclaimed that
rewards points were the world’s second largest currency, behind only the
37
dollar. As one commentator quipped, “[a]irlines don’t exist” because
38
they have been replaced by “loyalty compan[ies].”
To capitalize on the points craze, some firms have abandoned their
nontransferability policies. Alaska, American, Delta, Continental,
Northwest, U.S. Airways, and United allow their frequent flyers to

29. See, e.g., The Big 2-5, supra note 24.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Northwest Joins with MCI in Frequent-Flier Venture, Associated Press, June 14, 1988,
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Northwest-Joins-With-MCI-In-Frequent-Flyer-Venture/
id-95c07f6776a7ace810589a97c25bb01b.
32. See Andrew Clark, Frequent Flyer Miles Soar Above Sterling, Guardian (Jan. 7, 2005,
10:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2005/jan/08/business.theairlineindustry.
33. Airline Miles: Frequent-Flyer Economics, Economist (May 2, 2002), http://www.economist.com/
node/1109840.
34. See Ron Lieber, Now May Be a Good Time to Bail Out of Frequent-Flier Programs, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/now-may-bea-good-time-to-bail-out-of-frequent-flier-programs.html.
35. See Winship, supra note 6. In 2013, airlines sold nearly $20 billion in miles to “program partners.”
Christopher Elliott, Don’t Panic, But There Are No More Airlines, LinkedIn (Jan. 19, 2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20140119192325-332179-don-t-panic-but-there-are-nomore-airlines.
36. See Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Nw., Inc. v.
Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014) (No. 12-462).
37. See Airline Miles: Frequent-Flyer Economics, supra note 33.
38. Elliott, supra note 35.
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convey miles to each other for a fee. Similarly, on websites such as
Points.com, members can exchange points for PayPal credits and then
40
convert them into cash. In fact, as technology evolves, members may
41
soon be able to pay with points “anywhere they can use a credit card.”
Yet despite the porous boundary between miles and money, many
companies deny customers the ability to convey their earnings after
42
death. For instance, Alaska and United declare in their program terms
43
and conditions that points are not a member’s “property.” Although
this language does not expressly make points noninheritable, it achieves
44
that goal indirectly: decedents cannot transfer what they do not own.
Other companies are more forthright. For example, JetBlue states that
45
miles “are non-transferable . . . upon death.” Similarly, Hyatt covers
both bases by providing that “[a]ccrued points do not constitute property
of the [m]ember . . . and are not transferable to another person for any
46
reason including . . . inheritance.” And Delta recently made headlines
by changing its descendibility policy. Previously, the carrier allowed

39. See Ed Perkins, Can I Transfer My Frequent Flyer Miles?, SmarterTravel (Oct. 13, 2008),
http://www.smartertravel.com/travel-advice/can-transfer-my-frequent-flyer-miles.html?id=2678619.
40. Jane Genova, Frequent Flyer Miles: Perils of Unregulated Currencies, Payment Week (Apr. 21,
2014), http://paymentweek.com/2014-4-21-frequent-flyer-miles-perils-unregulated-currencies-33185.
41. Miles as Money, InsideFlyer, http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/article.php?key=8246 (last
visited May 10, 2015).
42. Some firms prohibit both lifetime and posthumous transfer. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions,
Sw. Airlines, http://www.southwest.com/html/customerservice/faqs.html?topic=rapid_rewards_program_
terms_and_conditions (last visited May 10, 2015).
43. See Conditions of Membership, Alaska Airlines, http://www.alaskaair.com/content/mileageplan/benefits/conditions-of-membership.aspx#transfers (last visited May 10, 2015); MileagePlus Rules,
United Airlines, http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/mileageplus/rules/default.aspx (last visited
May 10, 2015). These “not property” provisions are also common among companies that do not permit
members to transfer points during life. See, e.g., About Membership Rewards, Am. Express,
https://catalogue.membershiprewards.com.sg/aboutTerms.mtw (last visited May 10, 2015); HHonors
Terms & Conditions, Hilton, http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/terms/index.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
44. As I discuss in greater depth in Horton, supra note 4, at 57681, this “not property” rationale
also looms large in the context of pure indescendibility. For instance, courts have made cadaveric
organs indescendible by deeming them not to be a decedent’s property. See, e.g., Estate of Jimenez,
65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 714 (Ct. App. 1997). On the flip side, many jurisdictions deem the right of publicity
to be inheritable because it is a “species of intangible personal property.” State ex rel. Elvis Presley
Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
45. TrueBlue Terms and Conditions, JetBlue, https://trueblue.jetblue.com/web/trueblue/termsand-conditions (last visited May 10, 2015).
46. Hyatt Gold Passport Terms & Conditions, Hyatt, http://www.hyatt.com/hyatt/customer-service/
gp-terms-conditions.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015). American Airlines’ terms are similar, but also
grant the carrier the ability to make exceptions to its general stance of noninheritability:
Neither accrued mileage, nor award tickets, nor upgrades are transferable by the member
(i) upon death . . . . However, American Airlines, in its sole discretion, may credit accrued
mileage to persons specifically identified in court approved . . . wills upon receipt of
documentation satisfactory to American Airlines and upon payment of any applicable fees.
General AAdvantage Program Conditions, Am. Airlines, http://www.aa.com/i18n/AAdvantage/
programInformation/termsConditions.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015).
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47

SkyMiles to be inherited or willed. But in March 2013, Delta added the
following clause to the litany of reasons it can delete an account: “A
48
member is deceased.”
In sum, loyalty points have evolved from publicity stunts to possessions
49
that are “worth real money.” Along the way, they have become freely
transferable and yet increasingly noninheritable. And as I discuss next, a
similar pattern is emerging in the area of electronic possessions.
B. Virtual Assets
Another nascent form of wealth comes in the form of items won, built,
or purchased in video games. Massively multiplayer online role-playing
games (“MMORPG”) and virtual worlds are popular, in part, because
they offer participants “incremental rewards” to make them feel as if
50
“they are progressing and becoming more capable.” To climb this
ladder, players compete for items, coins, or powers. Again, though, many
of these scarce resources are indescendible.
The MMORPG World of Warcraft (“WoW”) illustrates the
51
property-like traits of virtual possessions. Players build up their
avatars—a process known as “leveling”—by “questing” (finishing tasks,
such as killing a boss or finding a hidden item) and “grinding” (defeating
52
as many enemies as possible). Accordingly, a seasoned avatar is a
substantial investment: it takes roughly nineteen days of uninterrupted
53
play to “level” a WoW character from one to sixty. Likewise, WoW
features a “robust, eBay-like in-game auction house system” in which

47. Scott McCartney, When You Expire, So Do Your Delta Miles, Wall St. J. (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2013/04/17/delta-air-lines-skymiles-when-you-expire-so-do-your-miles.
48. SkyMiles Rules & Conditions, Delta Airlines, http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/
skymiles/about-skymiles/program-rules-conditions.html (last visited May 10, 2015). Delta also clarified
that SkyMiles “are not the property of any member” and “may not be . . . pledged, or transferred
under any circumstances, including, without limitation, by operation of law, upon death, or in
connection with any domestic relations dispute and/or legal proceeding.” Id.
49. Stoller, supra note 1.
50. Seth Schiesel, Conquering the Burning Crusade, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/arts/warcraft-journal.html.
51. WoW boasts over 100 million accounts worldwide. See Olivia Grace, 100,000,000 World of
Warcraft Accounts Infographic, WoW Insider (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://wow.joystiq.com/
2014/01/28/100-000-000-world-of-warcraft-accounts-infographic. Other popular MMORPGs include
EverQuest, Final Fantasy, Legend of Mir, and Lineage. See generally Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an
Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 959, 960 (2012) (noting
that MMORPGs earned $2.7 billion in North America and Europe in 2010).
52. See Brett Burns, Comment, Level 85 Rogue: When Virtual Theft Merits Criminal Penalties, 80
UMKC L. Rev. 831, 832 n.11 (2012).
53. See Jennifer Miller, Comment, The Battle Over “Bots”: Anti-Circumvention, the DMCA, and
“Cheating” at World of Warcraft, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 653, 654 (2011). An avatar’s “level” refers to her
“overall effectiveness, power, usefulness, [and] strength . . . .” Level, WowWiki, http://www.wowwiki.com/
Level (last visited May 10, 2015).
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players can trade gold for combat gear, medicine, and other tools.
Outside of the game, WoW’s creator, Blizzard Entertainment, strictly
55
forbids trade in virtual goods. However, there is a thriving black
56
market. For instance, a level seventy character reportedly sold for
57
$10,000. Similarly, Chinese jail guards reportedly forced prisoners to
engage in virtual manual labor by “gold farming” within WoW, performing
58
repetitive tasks to earn virtual currency. Nevertheless, despite the
blurred line between digital and real money, Blizzard extends its antitransfer policy to decedents, dictating that players “have no ownership or
59
other property interest in any account.”
Unscripted simulations such as the City of Heroes, Entropia
Universe, The Sims, and Second Life feature an even starker example of
contractual indescendibility. Unlike WoW, where buying gold or weapons
60
is an illicit shortcut in a “hero’s journey,” these virtual worlds follow no
predetermined plot and therefore have no need to bar out-of-game sales.
To the contrary, they encourage players to invest real money in digital
goods. For example, Second Life permits users to design, construct, and
61
sell a range of items, including clothes, avatar skins, and “sex beds.”
Linden Labs, which runs Second Life, has adopted its own currency (the
Linden) and created an exchange (the LindeX) where consumers can
62
swap tangible dollars for their electronic counterpart (or vice versa).
Players engage in over a million transactions per day, and have transferred
63
a total of $3.2 billion in virtual assets. In fact, some people actually

54. Schiesel, supra note 50.
55. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, Blizzard Entm’t, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/
legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
56. This is true of MMORPGs generally. See Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for
Virtual World Property Rights, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 779, 786 (2006).
57. See Charles Phelps, More Inheritable Rights for Digital Assets, 41 Rutgers L. Rec. 131, 137 (2014).
58. See Paul Tassi, Chinese Prisoners Forced to Farm World of Warcraft Gold, Forbes (June 2,
2011, 9:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/06/02/chinese-prisoners-forced-to-farmworld-of-warcraft-gold.
59. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 55.
60. See Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1620, 1628 (2007).
61. Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 159, 165 (2010).
62. See Buying and Selling Linden Dollars, Second Life, http://community.secondlife.com/
t5/English-Knowledge-Base/Buying-and-selling-Linden-dollars/ta-p/700107 (last updated Aug. 6, 2012).
Linden also trumpets the fact that it “grant[s] its users intellectual property rights over all items and
structures created by them.” Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands—Why You Should
Monitor the Misuse of Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 667, 670 (2009).
63. See Jef Reahard, Second Life Readies for 10th Anniversary, Celebrates a Million Active Users Per
Month, Massively by Joystiq (June 20, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://massively.joystiq.com/2013/06/20/
second-life-readies-for-10th-anniversary-celebrates-a-million-a.
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“supplement their incomes . . . by working within [the] virtual world[].”
Linden Lab’s CEO, Philip Rosedale, has compared Second Life to a
“developing nation” and stated that, “[i]f people cannot own property,
65
the wheels of western capitalism can’t turn from the bottom.” But
despite this bold analogy, Linden is only willing to go so far. Its end user
66
license agreement makes players’ electronic belongings indescendible.
Accordingly, in the gaming realm, the line between virtual and real
property has worn paper-thin. Nevertheless, noninheritability is the
norm. And as I explain in Part I.C., a series of recent news items has cast
a spotlight on decedents’ inability to transmit the contents of their e-mail
and social media accounts.
C. E-mails and Social Media
Electronic information is a hallmark of our wired society. Without
access to a decedent’s e-mail account, a personal representative often
67
cannot marshal the estate’s assets and pay its debts. Similarly, social
media has blossomed into a kind of living museum that continuously
archives the present. However, many of these online assets die with their
owners.
Most e-mail service providers prohibit decedents from conveying
the contents of their accounts. This fact came into sharp relief in 2004,
when Justin Ellsworth, a twenty-year-old Marine, was killed by a roadside
68
bomb in Iraq. Apparently, Justin had expressed a desire to make a
69
scrapbook of the correspondence he had sent and received while overseas.
However, Yahoo! refused to grant his father access to his account, citing

64. Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 471, 472
(2010); see Quarmby, supra note 62, at 673 (“[U]sers have already made judicious use of their time in
Second Life to become highly successful in-world entrepreneurs.”).
65. Steven J. Horowitz, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
443, 448 (2007).
66. See Terms of Service, Linden Lab, http://lindenlab.com/tos (last visited May 10, 2015) (“[Users]
have no property, proprietary, intellectual property, ownership, economic, or monetary interest in
[their] Account, [or] Linden Dollars . . . .”). Similarly, Eve Online, a space adventure game, boasts “a fully
functioning economy, with regular trade of in-game currency and real money . . . .” Erik Kain, Massive
“EVE Online” Battle Could Cost $300,000 In Real Money [Update], Forbes (Jan. 29, 2014, 4:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2014/01/29/massive-eve-online-battle-could-cost-500000-in-real-money.
In one battle alone, players lost several hundred thousand dollars of virtual property. See id. Again,
however, the game’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) make those assets indescendible. EVE End User
License Agreement, EveOnline.com, http://community.eveonline.com/support/policies/eve-eula/ (last
visited May 10, 2015) (“You have no interest in the value of your time spent playing the Game, for
example, by the building up of the experience level of your character and the items your character
accumulates during your time playing the Game.”).
67. See Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J.
135, 13940 (2013) (discussing the importance of planning for the disposition of digital assets upon death).
68. See Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of
Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 397, 400.
69. Id.
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its terms of service (“TOS”), which declares that consumers have “[n]o
[r]ight of [s]urvivorship” in their accounts, which “terminate upon . . .
70
death.” Although a Michigan probate court ordered Yahoo! to disclose
Justin’s e-mails, the ISP grudgingly complied while “promis[ing] to
71
defend its commitment to treat user e-mails as private and confidential.”
Likewise, AOL, GMX, and Microsoft seem to mandate indescendibility,
72
although their TOS are less clear.
In a small step in the opposite direction, Google recently introduced
73
an Inactive Accounts Manager. This feature allows a user to name a
“trusted contact” who will receive notice if the user has not logged on for
74
a certain period of time. If the user chooses, the trusted contact can
75
access the user’s messaging, blogging, Picasa, and YouTube accounts.
At the same time, though, Google admonishes individuals other than the
trusted contact that only “in rare cases” will they be able to access a
76
deceased user’s content.
Finally, Facebook’s descendibility practices have also sparked
77
controversy. To commemorate its tenth anniversary, the Internet titan
made special “look back” videos for its users consisting of images they had
78
uploaded over the years. In a widely reported story from February 2014,

70. Id. at 400–01; Terms of Service, Yahoo!, https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms (last
updated Mar. 16, 2012) (“You agree that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to
your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of
a death certificate, your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.”).
71. Atwater, supra note 68, at 401.
72. See, e.g., Terms of Service, AOL, http://legal.aol.com/terms-of-service/full-terms (last updated
Sept. 15, 2014) (“Your username and account may be terminated if you do not sign on to a Service
with your username at least once every 90 days. . . . After we terminate or deactivate your account for
inactivity or any other reason, we have no obligation to retain, store, or provide you with any data,
information, e-mail, or other content that you uploaded, stored, transferred, sent, mailed, received,
forwarded, posted or otherwise provide to us . . . .”); General Terms and Conditions, GMX,
http://www.gmx.com/company/terms/#.1559512-footer-nav1-3 (last visited May 10, 2015) (“GMX
hereby grants, and you hereby accept, a nontransferable, revocable, non-sublicensable, and nonexclusive license to use the GMX Software and all related documentation for your own personal or
business use during the term of this Agreement.”); Microsoft Services Agreement, Microsoft
Windows, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/microsoft-services-agreement (last updated
June 11, 2014) (“Microsoft doesn’t permit users to transfer their Microsoft accounts [and] . . . . [y]ou
may not assign this Agreement or transfer any rights to use the Services.”).
73. See About Inactive Account Manager, Google, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/
3036546?hl=en (last visited May 10, 2015).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Accessing a Deceased Person’s Email, Google, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/
14300?hl=en (last visited May 10, 2015).
77. See generally Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1643 (2012) (discussing
Facebook’s inheritability policies); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts
When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 Pepp. L.
Rev. 185 (2012) (same).
78. See A Look Back, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/206982576163229 (last visited
May 10, 2015).
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a Missouri teenager named Jesse Berlin died unexpectedly, and his
79
father, John, became fixated on seeing Jesse’s “look back” movie.
When John was unable to access Jesse’s account, he shrewdly decided to
fight social media with social media and uploaded a tearful plea on
80
YouTube begging Mark Zuckerberg to release Jesse’s video. John’s
YouTube submission went viral, and Facebook soon announced that
81
they would honor his request. Yet the company also made clear that
they had created a special movie just for John—fashioned from publicly
available content on Jesse’s page—and that they would not necessarily
82
do the same thing for the families of other deceased consumers.
To summarize, the last two decades have seen the rise of electronic
assets that occupy a hazy way station between property and contract.
These parcels of fine print have real economic, social, and sentimental
significance. Increasingly, though, they purport to be indescendible. In
the next Part, I argue that courts should sometimes look beyond this label.

II. Challenging Contractual Indescendibility
83
A consumer who wishes to transmit a contractually indescendible
item must do three things. First, she has to prove that she has an
ownership interest in the asset. Second, she needs to invalidate the
noninheritability provision. And third, she will be forced to contend with
federal law. This Part examines each step in this process.
A. Ownership
Decedents can only transfer what they own. It is unclear whether
consumers possess this requisite interest in loyalty points and electronic
assets. But in this Subpart, I argue that courts need not grapple with the

79. See Keith Wagstaff, Father “In Shock” Over Response to Facebook Plea, NBC News (Feb. 7, 2014,
10:43 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/father-shock-over-response-facebook-plea-n24531.
80. See id.
81. See Brandon Griggs, Facebook Answers Grieving Dad’s Emotional Plea, CNN (Feb. 10, 2014,
10:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/06/tech/social-media/facebook-dad-video-appeal.
82. See Paresh Dave, Grieving Dad Gets ‘Look Back’ Video for Dead Son From Facebook, L.A.
Times (Feb. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/07/nation/la-na-nn-facebook-dead-son-20140207.
In the wake of the incident, Facebook announced that it was changing its “memorialization” policy.
Previously, the company only allowed “friends” of a deceased user to view her account. See Facebook
Changes Account Memorialization Policy, Fox News (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:39 AM), http://www.myfoxphilly.com/
story/24804786/facebook-changes-account-memorialization-policy. Now Facebook permits anyone to
view a decedent’s publically shared information. See id.
83. Of course, many disputes over contractual indescendibility may arise after the customer has passed
away. In that context, the consumer’s personal representative will step into her shoes and assert her rights.
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 55758 (noting that contract-based claims generally survive the death of
the plaintiff). As this Article was going to press, Facebook announced that it had amended its policies yet
again, and would permit users to designate a “legacy contact” who would be able to manage a deceased
user’s account. See What Is a Legacy Contact?, Facebook Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/help/
1568013990080948 (last visited May 10, 2015).
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blunt and binary matter of whether something is property. Instead, they
should ask a narrower question: is an item descendible? The answer
should revolve around whether customers have reason to believe that
they enjoy the privilege of posthumous conveyance.
The status of an item as either “property” or “not property” has
been a tempting shortcut for courts and lawmakers grappling with “pure”
84
descendibility issues. For instance, in the 1950s, states began to recognize
publicity rights, which protect individuals from the unauthorized use of
85
their name, voice, or image. At first, publicity rights were seen as an
offshoot of privacy rights, but gradually they came to be understood as a
86
species of property. This conceptual shift had an important doctrinal
corollary; as courts soon recognized, if publicity rights were property
87
88
rights, then they were inheritable. In addition, this “property syllogism”
can cut the other way. For instance, human body parts boast tremendous
89
90
financial value. Despite the facts that there is a dire kidney shortage
91
and that blood, hair, sperm, and eggs are freely alienable during life,
92
cadaveric tissue is indescendible. This result stems, in part, from the fact
that judges have decreed that organic material “forms no part of the
93
property of [the] estate.”
Similar issues are now swirling around contractual indescendibility.
This discussion has taken place in the shadow of F. Gregory Lastowka
and Dan Hunter’s forward-looking 2004 article, The Law of the Virtual

84. See id. at 55657, 56162.
85. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
86. See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 71, 8189 (2005).
87. See id. at 8489.
88. Id. at 74 (coining the phrase “property syllogism”).
89. See Michele Goodwin, Black Markets: The Supply and Demand of Body Parts 178 (2006)
(estimating that the average human body is worth over $220,000).
90. See Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Negotiate is
Non-Negotiable, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1367, 1370 (2007).
91. See Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship Over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & Health 75, 79 (2008).
92. See Horton, supra note 4, at 55257.
93. Estate of Jimenez, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 714 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting O’Donnell v. Slack,
55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899)); cf. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994)
(“Clearly, there can be no property right in a dead body . . . .”). In addition, a second (albeit less
prominent) reason for making cadaveric tissue indescendible is to avoid the commodification of the
human body. See Horton, supra note 4, at 554–57. This rationale is the driving force behind the related
rule that organs are market inalienable. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a)
(2015) (forbidding the acquisition or transfer of “any human organ for valuable consideration”); National
Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 98th Cong. 26 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (“Human organs should not be
treated like fenders in an auto junkyard.”); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 16, 8A U.L.A. 156 (2006)
(criminalizing the sale of human tissues); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1849, 1879–81 (1987).
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94

Worlds. Lastowka and Hunter began by noting that some virtual assets
mimic brick-and-mortar possessions by being rivalrous, persistent, and
95
valuable. For instance, purchasing a plot of “land” in the Sims Online
96
entitles a player to develop it, exclude others, and sell it. Lastowka and
Hunter then examined whether recognizing virtual ownership would
dovetail with three leading normative accounts of property rights. First,
Lastowka and Hunter analyzed utilitarianism, which they described as
the idea that “we should grant private property interests if doing so
97
would increase . . . social welfare.” They argued that the fact that
“millions of people labor to create objects of value in virtual worlds,”
revealed that the benefits of acknowledging digital property outweighed
98
the costs. Second, Lastowka and Hunter examined John Locke’s labordesert thesis. Locke famously posited that “[w]hatsoever [man] removes
out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he has mixed his
labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes
99
it his property.” Here, too, Lastowka and Hunter found that the scales
tipped toward carving out virtual rights, noting that users sink monumental
100
amounts of time and energy into earning online items. Finally, Lastowka
and Hunter viewed electronic possessions through the prism of Hegelian
101
personality theory. As amplified by contemporary writers like Margaret
Jane (Peggy) Radin, this strand of the private law canon suggests that the
law should protect cherished things such as a longtime home or a
102
wedding ring. Noting that people often feel as though their avatar is an
extension of their self, Lastowka and Hunter again concluded that there
should be no distinction between virtual property and its real-world
103
counterpart.
Although Lastowka and Hunter broke new ground, I have
reservations about their approach. For one, it can be indeterminate.
Consider the question of whether frequent flyers own their miles. Lastowka

94. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1
(2004). In roughly similar fashion, intellectual property scholars have discussed the normative implications
of honoring contractual provisions deeming transfers of software to be licenses (rather than sales). See,
e.g., John P. Uetz, The Same Song and Dance: F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records and the
Role of Licenses in the Digital Age of Copyright Law, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 177, 191 (2012).
95. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 30.
96. See id. at 3031. In an influential article published a year later, Joshua Fairfield amplified this point
with respect to a broader range of digital assets, including “internet resources” such as “URLs, domain
names, [and] email accounts.” Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1052 (2005).
97. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 44.
98. See id. at 45.
99. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952) (1690).
100. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 46.
101. See id. at 48–49.
102. See id.; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959
(1982) (“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves.”).
103. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 48.
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and Hunter would start with utilitarianism, by asking whether society
would be better off if loyalty points belonged to customers. However, it is
unclear how a court or a legislature would make that decision. Lastowka
and Hunter imply that a pivotal factor should be whether an item is popular,
noting that a “societal good is composed simply of aggregate individual
104
goods.” But this is a logical leap. The fact that many consumers derive
pleasure from an asset does not mean that broadening their control over
it would maximize their collective satisfaction. To the contrary, giving
customers an equity stake might decrease production. Indeed, firms would
be less likely to create rewards schemes if they were thrust into the role of
105
custodian for millions of accountholders. Compounding this uncertainty,
different panels in the Lastowka and Hunter triptych can point in opposite
directions. For example, if the utilitarian score for frequent flyer miles was
high, the personality rating of such a fungible asset might be much lower.
Even the most intuitive aspect of Lastowka and Hunter’s framework—
Lockean labor-desert—proves difficult to apply. To be sure, there is a
visceral appeal to tying ownership to the tedium of hours spent at 30,000
feet or the brain flash of the Second Life entrepreneur. However, it is not
clear why these individuals’ Lockean claim would trump the sponsoring
company’s rival Lockean claim. For instance, in the context of video
games, Stephen Horowitz has argued that Lastowka and Hunter give
short shrift to developers:
In most worlds, users do not “produce” the products they claim as
property; they earn them through battles with virtual beasts or
purchase them through trade with virtual shopkeepers. Such goods are
created through the labor of the operators before users take control of
them. When operators labor to produce virtual products, the operators
106
have a greater initial labor-based claim to ownership of such products.

And in any event, labor-desert is an especially poor fit for inheritance law.
Locke’s signature insight might explain why the first person who generates
an asset through hard work acquires the right to bequeath it or transmit
it via intestacy. But it cannot explain why the next generation—people
who may have never earned a loyalty point or clutched a joystick—also
107
deserve the same courtesy.

104. Id. at 45.
105. See Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not Property
Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 235, 25758 (2014).
106. Horowitz, supra note 65, at 453; see also Westbrook, supra note 56, at 79394 (“[T]here is a
clear outlay of labor, time and money on the part of both parties.”).
107. See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 396 (1990) (“[T]he labor-desert principle can
support at most a one-time power of gift or bequest.”). But see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang,
A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J. 1, 7 n.22 (1992) (asking whether “by creating
property through labor, the owner has a natural right not only to bequeath to her beneficiary but also
to bequeath the power to bequeath”).
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Finally, giving customers industrial strength property rights would
raise ponderous questions. Would firms need to compensate their clientele
every time they amended their rewards programs, or their servers crashed,
108
or they abandoned a virtual world? Could creditors attach a frequent
flyer’s account or a gamer’s avatar? What about jilted spouses in divorce
proceedings? These dilemmas illustrate why it is counterproductive to
force courts and lawmakers to make the black-and-white choice between
“property” and “not property.”
A better solution would examine each arrow in the quiver of
property rights individually. For the purposes of this Article, the critical
inquiry is whether customers reasonably think that they have the right to
control an asset after death. Of course, one might respond that no consumer
could hold such a belief about an asset that is marked “not property” or
“indescendible.” But to my mind, that objection puts the trailer before
the tractor. The fine print (and a customer’s potential knowledge of it)
relates to the next issue—whether the rights-stripping clause is valid—and
not the threshold matter of whether an asset is descendible. Instead, at this
preliminary stage, where we are merely trying to allocate the badges of
ownership, it makes more sense to focus on extra-contractual factors, such as
the drafter’s conduct. For instance, the fact that a company allowed an item
to be transferred during life could be evidence that it should be descendible.
The basic idea here is that subject to some exceptions, “inheritability and
109
alienability . . . ‘go hand in hand.’” Thus, a frequent flyer, gamer, or
Internet user could justifiably assume that she possesses the power of
posthumous transmission over an asset she can sell or give away.
Seen through this lens, many of the items I have discussed would be
descendible. Electronic assets in worlds like Second Life would be a
particularly easy case. Indeed, Linden has encouraged real world sales of
virtual products and proclaimed that players hold “property rights” in
110
their inventions. Similarly, users can freely share e-mails and social
media uploads. Because these things practically belong to an individual
during life, there is no reason to exclude them from her estate.
Rewards points would be slightly more fraught. As noted, many
airlines, hotels, and car rental agencies allow customers to trade miles or
111
their equivalent. However, they also charge fees and impose limits on
112
these transactions. Moreover, miles can expire, which seems inconsistent

108. Cf. Cifrino, supra note 105, at 25758 (listing various ways in which developers could face
liability if lawmakers carved out virtual property rights for gamers).
109. Horton, supra note 4, at 576 (quoting Micheletti v. Moidel, 32 P.2d 266, 267 (Colo. 1934)).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 6165.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 3739.
112. See Transferring Miles and Points, InsideFlyer, http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/
article.php?key=6373 (last visited May 10, 2015).

Horton_16 (EGK) (1)

1064

5/21/2015 12:05 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1047

113

with the idea that they truly belong to travelers. Given these restrictions,
perhaps it would not be plausible for members to think that their points
are descendible.
But then again, more than any other intangible asset, points have
blossomed into a quasi-currency. Consumers can earn them and redeem
114
them almost like cash. In addition, members perceive their points to be
a form of wealth. As one commentator remarked, “[e]arning frequent
flyer miles in the minds of most people is akin to earning money and the
idea that your miles . . . would simply disappear when you die strikes a
115
profoundly disturbing note.” Similarly, in some circumstances, the
receipt of loyalty credits triggers the dark side of ownership: taxation. In
August 2014, the Tax Court held in Shankar v. Commissioner that the
petitioner should have reported the 500 Citibank “thank you” points he
116
collected for opening his account and used to purchase an airline ticket.
The court characterized the credits as “something given in exchange for
the use (deposit) of [petitioner’s] money; i.e., something in the nature of
117
interest.” Thus, customers could easily think that miles—the functional
equivalent of “money” and “interest”—are descendible.
A final set of complications arise from companies that impose strict
nontransferability policies only to ignore them. A prime example is
Blizzard, which has endured years of criticism for tolerating under-the118
table sales of WoW goods. Although there is a paucity of authority, at
least one decision suggests that a company’s actual practices are more
probative than its stance on paper. In In re Platt, a bankruptcy case, the
Boston Red Sox argued that a nonconveyance clause in a subscription
119
agreement elucidated that season tickets were not the debtor’s property.
The judge disagreed, citing the franchise’s “pattern of arbitrarily and even
capriciously permitting transfers” to find that the debtor held “property
120
right[s]” in the seats. Courts should reach the same conclusion when
asked to declare that a firm’s sporadic enforcement of its nontransferability
provision justifies a consumer’s impressions that an item is inheritable.

113. See, e.g., Airline Miles Expiration Policies Roundup, Points Guy (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://thepointsguy.com/2013/04/airline-miles-expiration-policies-roundup.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 3739.
115. Delta Skymiles Now Die When You Do, Flynaija (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.flynaija.com/
delta-skymiles-now-die-when-you-do.
116. 143 T.C. No. 5 (2014).
117. Id. at 13. On the other hand, the IRS has promised not to assert that frequent flyer miles are
taxable if they are “attributable to the taxpayer’s business or official travel.” Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax
Court Sides With IRS In Tax Treatment Of Frequent Flyer Miles Issued By Citibank, Forbes (Aug. 28,
2014, 8:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/28/tax-court-sides-with-irs-in-taxtreatment-of-frequent-flyer-miles-issued-by-citibank.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 5659. Similarly, carriers such as Virgin purport to ban the
transfer of miles, but make exceptions on a “case-by-case basis.” Stoller, supra note 1.
119. 292 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
120. Id.
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Accordingly, judges need not begin their contractual indescendibility
analysis with the cartoonish question of whether an item is a consumer’s
property. Instead, they should ask whether a firm has led customers to
believe that an asset is descendible. But as I discuss next, even if a
consumer prevails on this issue, she must also convince the court not to
enforce the noninheritability clause.
B. Validity
Customers may challenge indescendibility provisions on three grounds.
First, they may argue that they never assented to the clause. Second, they
can invoke the unconscionability defense. And third, if a drafter adds an
indescendibility provision to an existing contract, customers might claim
that the unilateral revision violates the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. This Subpart evaluates these theories.
1.

Lack of Assent

Because virtually all indescendibility provisions appear in agreements
that are consummated online, they occupy an unsettled area of contract
law. Courts once decided whether users assented to Internet agreements
by applying a formalistic rubric that divided those contracts into two
camps. On the one hand, there were clickwraps, boxes full of text that
121
prompt a user to select “I agree.” Judges favored this species of eagreement, reasoning that the customer’s click was the digital equivalent
122
of a signature or a handshake. On the other hand, courts were less
sanguine about browsewraps, in which drafters simply posted provisions
123
on a website and declared that visitors had accepted them. Browsewraps
124
were valid only if the user had actual or constructive notice of the terms.
Beginning about three years ago, judges began to recognize a third
125
kind of online deal, “modified clickwrap” (or “multi-wrap”). These
web pages feature a hyperlink to the TOS near the button that a user must
press to complete the transaction. Thus, like browsewraps, the contract’s
provisions are not immediately apparent; however, as with clickwraps,

121. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
122. See, e.g., Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011); TradeComet.com
LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 37778 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488, 49697 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use,
91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 466 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
124. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002); Zaltz v. JDATE,
952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 56465
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
125. See Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using the
phrase “modified clickwrap”); Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations And Ramifications 6364
(2013) (referring both to “modified clickwrap[s]” and “multi-wraps”).
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the consumer must actually do something—press, “I agree”—to indicate
126
her assent.
127
For instance, in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., the Southern District of
New York struggled with whether to enforce a forum-selection clause in
128
Facebook’s TOS. To open an account, customers must click a button
129
that says “Sign Up,” which appears next to a hyperlink to the TOS. The
court noted that this arrangement was like a browsewrap in the way that
the TOS were not visible, but also like a clickwrap because it tasked the
130
user with actively indicating assent. Relying on the fact that the plaintiff
was Internet savvy, the court held that he had agreed to the TOS:
The mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar, even obtuse to
many people. But it is not too much to expect that an internet user whose
social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly
caused him mental anguish would understand that the hyperlinked
phrase “Terms of Use” is really a sign that says “Click Here for Terms
of Use.” . . . Here, [the plaintiff] was informed of the consequences of
his assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to
131
click to understand those consequences. That was enough.

Two similar cases have gone the other way, however. In Nguyen v.
132
Barnes & Noble Inc., the Ninth Circuit declined to enforce an online
133
retailer’s arbitration clause. Barnes & Noble’s TOS is accessible through a
hyperlink that appears near the button that a shopper must push to
134
complete a purchase. Nevertheless, the appellate panel held that the
plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice of the provisions:
[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous
hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no
notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to
demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant
buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise
to constructive notice. . . . Given the breadth of the range of technological
savvy of online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out

126. See, e.g., Vernon v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 114950 (D. Colo. 2012) aff’d,
925 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo. 2013) (describing these “hybrid arrangements”).
127. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
128. See id. at 83538.
129. See id. at 83435.
130. See id. at 83637.
131. Id. at 83940; see also Swift, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (deeming a consumer to be bound because
she “was provided with an opportunity to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink immediately
under the ‘I accept’ button”).
132. 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
133. See id. at 117778.
134. See id. at 1177. Admittedly, the appellate panel characterized the TOS as browsewrap, and
never employed the phrases “modified clickwrap” or “multi-wrap.” See id. at 1176. Yet from the
court’s own description, it is clear that the Barnes & Noble TOS possess the hallmarks of such an
agreement, a “‘Terms of Use’ link [that] appears either directly below the relevant button a user must
click on to proceed in the checkout process or just a few inches away.” Id. at 1178.
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hyperlinks to terms and conditions to which they have no reason to
135
suspect they will be bound.
136

Even more to the point, in Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., a Massachusetts
appellate court refused to honor a forum-selection clause in a dispute over
137
the descendibility of an e-mail account. The plaintiffs, co-administrators
for their deceased brother John’s estate, sought a declaratory judgment
138
that John’s electronic correspondence belonged to his estate. A
probate judge invoked the portion of Yahoo!’s TOS that requires
139
customers to pursue claims in California. When the plaintiffs appealed,
Yahoo! defended the order below by asserting that John could not have
created his account without “expressly manifest[ing] assent” to the TOS
140
(presumably by pressing a button to create his account). The reviewing
court reversed, reasoning that Yahoo! had failed to prove that John (or
other plaintiffs) had either seen the TOS or agreed to them by “clicking
141
‘I accept’ or by taking some similar action.”
Notably, many contractual indescendibility clauses appear in modified
142
143
clickwraps. For instance, to become an AAdvantage or SkyMiles
144
145
146
member, to partake in WoW or Second Life, or to open a Yahoo!

135. Id. at 117879.
136. 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
137. See id. at 61213.
138. See id. at 609.
139. See id. at 610.
140. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Yahoo! Inc. at 28, Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d 604 (No. 2012-P-0178).
I say “presumably” because Yahoo’s briefs were a little coy about what exactly John needed to do to
christen the service. Compare id. at 3 (asserting without further explanation that “[i]n order to create
the account, John Ajemian (like all Yahoo! users) agreed to Yahoo!’s Terms of Service”), with id. at
28 (claiming that “[t]he account could not have been successfully created if the user had not agreed to
accept the terms prior to submitting the registration data to Yahoo!”). As I discuss infra note 146,
Yahoo’s current TOS is a modified clickwrap.
141. Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 61213.
142. To join AAdvantage, a traveler must check a box that says, “I agree to the Terms and Conditions of
the AAdvantage program.” Join AAdvantage Program, Am. Airlines, https://www.aa.com/AAdvantage/
quickEnroll.do (last visited May 10, 2015). The phrase “Terms and Conditions” is in underlined blue
text, indicating that it is a hyperlink to the actual contract. Id. Similarly, every time members log in to
their account, they must press a button marked “Login” that appears just below the phrase “[b]y
logging into my AAdvantage account, I hereby accept the Terms and Conditions of the AAdvantage
program.” AAdvantage, Am. Airlines, https://www.aa.com/AAdvantage/aadvantageHomeAccess.do (last
visited May 10, 2015). Again, “Terms and Conditions” is a hyperlink. Id. Nevertheless, the website
never forces the user to trudge through the actual contract.
143. Similarly, Delta’s SkyMiles membership application requires users to click “I agree to the
terms and conditions,” but confusingly has a hyperlink to “membership guide & program rules.”
SkyMiles, Delta, https://www.delta.com/profile/enrolllanding.action (last visited May 10, 2015).
144. See Sign Up, World of Warcraft, https://us.battle.net/account/creation/wow/signup (last
visited May 10, 2015).
145. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
146. See Sign Up, Yahoo!, https://edit.yahoo.com/registration?_done=http%3A%2F%2Fmail.
yahoo.com&fsredirect=1&fs=x4wNmgeHafCyitdC_YmaQ5qn3e07XVj8yY9EKt5KHoc8Yc2ei2QYqF
9iOcTi5738q2S1Xhi0 (last visited May 10, 2015).
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147

or Google account, one must check a box next to a statement that
announces one’s acquiescence to the TOS. Yet to find the actual meat of
148
the contract, one must migrate to a different webpage via a hyperlink. To
be sure, as in Fteja, a drafter might be able bridge this gap between apparent
and actual agreement by proving that a consumer was sophisticated.
Then again, that may be a tough row to hoe in the indescendibility context,
where the star witness will often be deceased. Thus, at least until companies
redesign their websites, their indescendibility provisions may not be
149
binding.
2.

Unconscionability

Consumers can also claim that noninheritability provisions are
150
unconscionable. Over the past two decades, this notoriously amorphous
rule has become the weapon of choice against unfair terms in adhesion
151
contracts. First, the term must be procedurally unconscionable, which
usually means that it has been offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a
152
party with superior bargaining muscle, or buried in fine print. Most
noninheritability clauses fit both criteria. Indeed, they are created by
powerful firms as part of a standardized template and secreted on web
153
pages that most users will never see. For example, in Bragg v. Linden
154
Research, Inc., a Pennsylvania district court applying California law
considered whether to enforce an arbitration clause in Second Life’s
155
TOS. The plaintiff had sued Linden for “unlawfully confiscat[ing] his
156
virtual property and den[ying] him access to their virtual world.”
Despite the fact that the plaintiff was an attorney and an avid gamer, the

147. Create Your Google Account, Google, https://accounts.google.com/SignUp (last visited May 10, 2015).
148. See supra notes 135140.
149. Admittedly, some firms will not have this problem. For example, United Airlines’
MileagePlus site is a standard clickwrap that displays the text of the TOS above the “I agree” button.
See MileagePlus Enrollment, United Airlines, http://www.united.com/web/en-US/apps/account/enroll.aspx
(last visited May 10, 2015).
150. Complicating matters, some of these agreements also contain choice-of-law clauses. See, e.g.,
General AAdvantage Terms and Conditions, Am. Airlines, http://www.aa.com/i18n/AAdvantage/
programInformation/termsConditions.jsp#general-aadvantage-program-conditions (last visited May 10,
2015) (“These terms and conditions are governed by and to be interpreted in accordance with the laws
of the State of Texas.”). As a result, there may be preliminary skirmish over whether the chosen state’s
law violates a strong public policy of the jurisdiction where the consumer has sued. See, e.g., David Horton,
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 Geo. L.J. 1217, 123637
(2013) (discussing similar litigation in the context of challenges to the validity of arbitration clauses).
151. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967) (articulating the now well-known two-part test for unconscionability).
152. Courts sometimes refer to the drafter’s market power as “oppression” and the term’s physical
appearance as “surprise.” See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Ct. App. 1982).
153. See supra notes 146152.
154. 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
155. See id. at 60607.
156. Id. at 595.
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court held that the dispute resolution provision was procedurally
157
unconscionable because it was nonnegotiable and inconspicuous.
Some cases also predicate procedural unconscionability on an
adherent showing that she lacked “a meaningful choice of reasonably
available alternative sources of supply from which to obtain the desired
158
goods and services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.”
This additional “market alternatives” element is a crude attempt to
implement the insights of the law and economics movement of the 1970s
and 1980s. Scholars such as Alan Schwartz, Louis Wilde, and George
Priest argued that companies in competitive industries must pass their
159
savings from “unfair” provisions back to consumers. If this is true, then
“one-sided” terms may not be “one-sided” at all. Indeed, it is entirely
possible that adherents would rather surrender certain liberties and pay
160
less for an item than retain their rights and spend more. In theory, the
market alternatives rule identifies sectors in which the lockstep use of a
particular clause makes it impossible for consumers to shop for their
161
preferred combination of term “harshness” and price.
Nevertheless, this extra doctrinal component will probably not save
indescendibility provisions from being procedurally unconscionable. As
noted above, frequent fliers, gamers, and social media users have little
162
choice but to accept such a clause. Moreover, there is no true parallel
for distinctive universes such as WoW or services such as Facebook.
Perhaps the one niche in which consumers have a choice is e-mail. As
163
noted, indescendibility is the norm, with the exception of Google. But
even Google has stopped short of recognizing unfettered inheritability.
Although trusted contacts can obtain the contents of a user’s account,

157. Id. at 60607.
158. Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005). But see Gatton
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 35556 (Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting the additional “market
alternatives” requirement).
159. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis
L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product
Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981).
160. See Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, supra note 159, at 1072
& n.38.
161. One flaw with the market alternatives rule is that the widespread use of a particular term can
actually cut the other way. Indeed, the fact that most drafters in a competitive market employ a provision
suggests that the provision strikes the ideal balance between “harshness” and price. See, e.g., David Horton,
Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 459, 476 (2014) (book review). In
addition, as Russell Korobkin has argued, consumers will only be able to exert pressure on drafters to
offer efficient “salient” terms. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 123439 (2003).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 4348, 6175.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 7679.
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other individuals, including a decedent’s personal representative, may
164
not be so lucky. Accordingly, even in the eyes of judges who insist on
market alternatives, most indescendibility clauses will probably be
procedurally unconscionable.
Unfortunately, substantive unconscionability is harder to predict.
Contract provisions are substantively unconscionable if they are unfair,
165
one-sided, or “unreasonably favorable” to the drafter. Is it “harsh” to
eliminate the power to bequeath an item or pass it through intestacy? The
bulk of the substantive unconscionability case law deals with arbitration
166
clauses, which are difficult to analogize to indescendibility provisions.
However, the importance of the right surrendered bolsters the case for
undue unfairness. People feel very strongly about their ability to transmit
167
property to their loved ones after they die. After all, it “has been part
168
of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.” Being stripped
of that prerogative is no small thing.
Another aspect of the substantive unconscionability calculus is
whether a suspect term has a “reasonable justification . . . based on
169
‘business realities.’” As I have discussed elsewhere, one rationale for
170
“pure” indescendibility is avoiding administrative costs. The idea here
is that not all property transitions seamlessly from the dead to the living.
For example, if body parts were inheritable, personal representatives
171
would need to spend time and money preserving the decedent’s tissues.
Some companies’ explanations for their indescendibility policies are
roughly similar. For instance, airlines claim that they have limited
frequent flyer rights so that they “no longer ha[ve] to devote resources to
172
the transfer process.” Yet this is a transparent fig leaf. As noted, many
173
carriers allow members to swap miles while alive. The firms that do
permit the posthumous conveyance of intangible assets only require a
photocopy of the decedent’s death certificate and a letter from her
174
personal representative. These burdens are no worse than opening or

164. See supra text accompanying notes 77–80; see also Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased
User’s Account, Google, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/2842525?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532
(last visited May 10, 2015) (“Any decision to [provide the contents of a deceased user’s account] will
be made only after a careful review.”).
165. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
166. See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387 (2012).
167. See Lewis M. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 21 (1955) (“[T]he desire to dispose
of property by will is very general, and very strong.”).
168. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
169. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000).
170. See Horton, supra note 4, at 58688, 59496.
171. See id. at 58688.
172. Delta Skymiles Now Die When You Do, supra note 115.
173. See supra notes 3941.
174. See Chelsea Emery, Don’t Let Frequent Flyer Miles Die With You, Reuters, Mar. 1, 2013,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/us-inheritance-airmiles-idUSBRE9200I420130301.
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closing an account. Accordingly, when noninheritability provisions seem
like little more than a raw exercise of drafting power, they should be
substantively unconscionable.
Alternatively, in the e-mail and social media context, some ISPs and
commentators have claimed that indescendibility protects customers’
175
privacy. In this era of online banking, perhaps deeming a decedent’s
logon information or password to be inheritable would raise the specter
176
of identity theft. In addition, permitting personal representatives to
rummage through a decedent’s online accounts might create a risk of
embarrassing content falling into the wrong hands. Justin Atwater lucidly
describes this concern:
Imagine a typical teenager who shares the most intimate details of her
life with her closest friends through instant and text messaging. If she
dies intestate, should her parents be allowed to view the details of her
personal text messages on the basis that the messages should pass
through intestacy in the same manner as other property? What if,
instead, she married and later died testate, devising the residue of her
estate to her spouse without mentioning the e-mail account. Should her
spouse be granted access to the intimate details of her life before they
were married on the basis that the messages are part of her residual
177
estate?

Yet the privacy argument is not fully compelling. For one, it does
not apply to decedents who have expressly attempted to bequeath their
digital assets. Indeed, those individuals have decided for themselves that
the advantages of descendibility outweigh the dangers. Moreover, I
doubt that noninheritability is the appropriate default even for people
who died intestate or with estate plans that do not mention their online
accounts. The specter of embezzlement or discovery of salacious
information is not unique to the Internet. To the contrary, it exists any
time a personal representative steps into a decedent’s shoes and begins
178
sorting through her diaries, old letters, and safe deposit boxes. Thus, it
is not clear that ISPs should be able to justify noninheritability provisions
179
on this ground.

But see Banta, supra note 4, at 83536 (proposing that companies recoup the expense of complying
with decedents’ or beneficiaries’ wishes by imposing transfer fees).
175. See, e.g., Rebecca G. Cummings, The Case Against Access to Decedents’ E-Mail: Password
Protection As an Exercise of the Right to Destroy, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 897, 90607 (2014); Lilian
Edwards & Edina Harbinja, Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of the
Deceased in A Digital World, 32 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 83, 8587 (2013).
176. See, e.g., Molly Wilkens, Note, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are
They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 Hastings L.J. 1037, 104852 (2011).
177. Atwater, supra note 68, at 404.
178. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1716 (“While there is always the potential that even an executor or
administrator could misappropriate [online] information, this risk is present in the administration of tangible
assets as well as digital ones, and state fiduciary law is designed to guard against just such misuse.”).
179. For another jaundiced take on the privacy rationale, see Banta, supra note 4, at 83740
(noting that some of the same IPS that claim to be safeguarding privacy are facing lawsuits for sharing
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Violation of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Finally, a company’s attempt to add an indescendibility clause to
existing agreements may violate the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Contracts often contain change-of-terms provisions, which
180
empower drafters to modify their arrangements with consumers. In the
181
seminal case of Badie v. Bank of America, a commercial lender sent “billstuffers” to its checking and credit card customers informing them that
the terms of the contract had changed and they were now obligated to
182
arbitrate any dispute. A California appellate court held that the bank’s
183
gambit was in bad faith. As the judges explained, because the initial
agreements said nothing about dispute resolution, the bank improperly
sought to inject “an entirely new term which ha[d] no bearing on any
184
subject, issue, right, or obligation addressed in the original contract.”
Similar maneuvers with indescendiblity provisions may meet the same
fate. Delta’s efforts are illustrative. To be sure, the airline “reserve[s] the
right to change program rules, benefits, [and] regulations, . . . at any time
185
Yet nothing in the carrier’s previous SkyMiles
without notice.”
agreement speaks to the issue of inheritability. Although its contract
prohibits “[s]ale or [b]arter,” these sections relate to exchanges for
186
consideration, not gratuitous transfers. Arguably, because the original
deal does not address bequests and intestacy, the new indescendibility
clause is too jarring a departure to be valid.
Accordingly, there are strong arguments that noninheritability
provisions should not be binding. Nevertheless, as I explain next, companies
do not create rewards points and digital assets on a blank slate. Instead, a
maze of federal regulation governs this area.
C. Federal Law
This Subpart discusses the federal dimensions of contractual
indescendibility. It shows that the ADA may preclude frequent flyers
from striking down noninheritability clauses. It then evaluates whether
the SCA precludes ISPs from releasing a decedent’s electronic assets to
her personal representative.
customer data); Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns A Decedent’s E-Mails:
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 281, 31314
(2007) (noting that most privacy-related claims expire upon death).
180. See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. Rev. 605, 60809 (2010).
181. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1992).
182. See id. at 27677.
183. See id. at 28384.
184. Id. at 284.
185. Delta Membership Guide & Program Rules, Delta, http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/
skymiles/about-skymiles/program-rules-conditions.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2015).
186. Id.
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The Airline Deregulation Act

Congress passed the ADA in 1978 to promote “efficiency, innovation,
and low prices” in the airline industry through “maximum reliance on
187
competitive market forces.” The statute provides that “a State . . . may
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
188
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .”
In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court determined that the ADA
preempts an array of state law claims.
189
First, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the National
Association of Attorneys General had issued Air Travel Industry
190
Enforcement Guidelines (“NAAG Guidelines”). This phalanx of rules,
made obligatory through state consumer protection statutes, required
carriers to be forthright about any restrictions in their advertising and
191
frequent flyer program solicitations. The Court first examined the
scope of the ADA preemption clause, which bars state regulation
192
“related to” an airline “price, route, or services.” The Court determined
that this phrase sweeps broadly, and means “having a connection with or
193
reference to” airline operations. Gauged by this yardstick, the Court
found that the fare advertising portions of the NAAG Guidelines were
impermissibly entangled with airline “rates.” For one, they “establish[ed]
binding requirements as to how tickets may be marketed if they are to be
194
sold at given prices.” In addition, because there is a tight link between
marketing practices and costs in an industry, “state restrictions on fare
195
advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares.” Thus, the
Court held that the ADA eclipsed the NAAG Guidelines.
Two years later, in American Airlines v. Wolens, the Court offered a
196
more fine-grained reading of the statute. A class of AAdvantage
members asserted that the carrier’s retroactive changes to its frequent
flyer policies violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and constituted a
197
breach of contract. The Court began by parsing the text of the ADA’s
preemption clause. The Court noted that this provision contains two
elements: it forbids states from (1) affecting “rates, routes, or services”
198
by (2) “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law.” The Court explained that

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6), (a)(12)(A) (2015).
Id. § 41713(b)(1).
504 U.S. 374 (1992).
Id. at 37980.
Id. at 38788.
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Morales, 504 U.S. at 38384.
Id. at 388.
Id.
513 U.S. 219 (1995).
Id. at 22425.
Id. at 226.
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both the consumer protection and breach of contract claims met the first
component: they pertained to “‘rates,’ i.e., American’s charges in the
form of mileage credits for free tickets and upgrades, and to ‘services,’
199
i.e., access to flights and class-of-service upgrades.” However, the
Court found the second prong more complicated. According to the
Court, the Consumer Fraud Act was undoubtedly an example of a state
200
“enact[ing] or enforc[ing]” law: after all, it was an Illinois statute. Yet
the same could not be said for the breach of contract allegations. Indeed,
the Court reasoned, the breach of contract claims did not arise from an
external mandate imposed by the jurisdiction, but rather sought redress
201
for “the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”
Therefore, the ADA only preempted the consumer protection claims.
This distinction between state-mandated and voluntarily assumed
duties was front and center in the Court’s 2014 decision in Northwest, Inc. v.
202
Ginsberg. Northwest’s WorldPerks terms and conditions gave it sole
203
discretion to disqualify customers for abusing the program. Northwest
had used this dominion to revoke the membership of Minnesota resident
Rabbi S. Binyomin Ginsberg, who then sued, alleging that the carrier had
204
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically,
Ginsberg alleged that Northwest had terminated his account in an
205
attempt to cut costs by slashing its WorldPerks roster. It was unclear
how to classify this claim under Wolens. On the one hand, the implied
covenant vindicates extrinsic state policies by superimposing “community
206
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.” Thus, it would seem
to be preempted. On the other hand, the doctrine merely enforces the
true terms of the contract. Because it forbids self-serving conduct to
207
effectuate the parties’ “justified expectations,” it also seemed analogous
to the non-preempted breach of contract claim in Wolens.
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously held that Minnesota’s version
of the implied covenant was “a state-imposed obligation,” in contravention
208
of the ADA. The Court reached this conclusion for one reason in
particular: because “under Minnesota law parties cannot contract out of
209
the covenant.” The Court opined that the mandatory nature of the rule

199. Id.
200. Id. at 22728.
201. Id. at 228.
202. 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014).
203. Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 653 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011).
204. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1426.
205. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof at *7, Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., No. 09-CV-28 JLS NLS, 2009 WL 9523735 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009).
206. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981).
207. Id.
208. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1432.
209. Id.
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confirmed that it was a creation of the state rather than “an attempt to
210
vindicate the parties’ implicit understanding of the contract.” Yet the
Court stressed the limited scope of its ruling, highlighting that the ADA
does not eclipse all implied covenant claims:
[P]etitioners exhort us to go further and hold that all such claims, no
matter the content of the law of the relevant jurisdiction, are preempted. If pre-emption depends on state law, petitioners warn, airlines
will be faced with a baffling patchwork of rules, and the deregulatory
aim of the ADA will be frustrated. But the airlines have means to
avoid such a result. A State’s implied covenant rules will escape preemption only if the law of the relevant State permits an airline to
contract around those rules in its frequent flyer program agreement,
and if an airline’s agreement is governed by the law of such a State, the
airline can specify that the agreement does not incorporate the
211
covenant.

But this is faux modesty. Ginsberg’s supposed limiting principle—
that the ADA does not eclipse versions of the implied covenant that
parties can “contract around”—might as well exempt unicorns or flying
pigs. I am not aware of any state that permits parties to expressly
212
sanction bad faith conduct. Thus, the decision encourages airlines to
mimic Delta and unilaterally amend their frequent flyer terms to make
miles indescendible. Moreover, Ginsberg sounds the death knell for
unconscionability challenges to indescendibility provisions in frequent
flyer agreements. Although the opinion does not mention the doctrine,
the case’s briefing and oral argument cast unconscionability as a
boogeyman, the paradigmatic example of a state law that “seek[s] to
210. Id. As an alternative basis for his holding, Justice Alito also noted that Minnesota did not
read the covenant into all contracts, but rather exempted employment contracts for “policy reasons.”
Id. Accordingly, he observed that “the decision not to exempt other types of contracts must be based
on a policy determination, namely, that the ‘policy reasons’ that support the rule for employment contracts
do not apply (at least with the same force) in other contexts.” Id.
211. Id. at 1433.
212. Of course, drafters can displace the implied covenant by spelling out their performance
obligations in detail rather than using open-ended terms such as “sole discretion.” Thus, some cases
have referred to the covenant as a “gap-filling default rule,” rather than a mandatory principle, because it
“comes into play when a question is not resolved by the terms of the contract or when one party has
the power to make a discretionary decision without defined standards.” Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC
v. Tropic Enters., Inc., 966 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet
the Court’s requirement that the covenant be “waivable” demands that a state enforce a provision that
says something like “the implied covenant shall not apply to this agreement.” Indeed, during oral
argument, Justice Alito, who wrote the opinion, conceptualized the issue that way:
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me ask you this. Suppose you have in Minnesota or one of the
States where you say the covenant is simply a way of effectuating the intent of the parties,
you have a contract between two very tough and nasty businessmen. And they write right in
their contract, you know, we’re going to comply with the literal terms of this contract, but
we do not promise each other that we’re going to proceed in good faith or that we are going
to deal with each other fairly. We are going to take every advantage we can under the literal
terms of the contract. Now, would that get rid of the covenant under Minnesota law?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462).
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enlarge the parties’ bargain” to effectuate policies “external to the
213
agreement.” Thus, the ADA seems to deny frequent flyers the two
most potent means to attack noninheritability provisions.
There are three caveats to this gloomy conclusion. First, as noted
above, some airlines may not be able to prove that frequent flyers have
214
assented to their TOS. The Court strongly implied that Ginsberg’s
complaint would not have been preempted if it was rooted in a state rule
that sought “to effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their
215
Principles of offer and acceptance do
reasonable expectations.”
precisely that: they determine the existence and scope of “obligation[s] . . .
216
that the parties voluntarily undertook.” Thus, the ADA should not
prevent courts from finding that a consumer never agreed to an
indescendibility provision.
A second slender ray of light stems from the evolution of loyalty
points. As I have discussed, members now earn most of their miles
217
through tie-ins and credit card purchases rather than travel. Because
the ADA only preempts state law that impacts “a price, route, or
218
service,” a plaintiff who has earned her credits on the ground might be
able escape the statute’s gravitational pull. In fact, Ginsberg left the door
ajar for such a case, noting that the plaintiff “did not assert that he
earned his miles from any activity but taking flights or that he attempted
219
to redeem miles for anything but tickets and upgrades.” And once a
case falls outside of the ADA’s ambit, nothing prevents a court from
deeming an indescendibility provision to be unconscionable or a bad
faith unilateral amendment.
A third potential limit flows from untangling various strands of the
implied covenant. Recall that Ginsberg faulted Northwest for exercising
its discretionary right to terminate his SkyMiles membership for the
220
purpose of reducing its overhead. The gravamen of such a claim is that
the airline did something it had the express right to do for an improper
reason. As such, it could easily be conceptualized as seeking to enforce a
free-floating, policy-driven obligation to perform contractual duties fairly.

213. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462); see also Brief for
Steven J. Burton, Professor of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13, Ginsberg, 134
S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462) (containing an entire section entitled “The Implied Covenant is Not Like the
Unconscionability Doctrine”); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 21 (“MR. YELLIN: . . .
[D]octrines [like] unconscionability . . . impose extracontractual limitations on the parties’ choices.”).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 146152.
215. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (quoting Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1980)).
216. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 3536.
218. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2015).
219. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 208209.
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Conversely, a Badie-style challenge to a unilateral amendment bears
221
specifically on the question of what the parties’ bargain is. Indeed, it
attempts to stop the drafter from expanding the contract beyond its
original scope. Thus, rather than merely trying to stamp out self-serving
conduct, a consumer who seeks to overturn a carrier’s ex post addition of
an indescendibility provision is arguing “I did not agree to that.” Perhaps
this difference could prompt a future court to distinguish Ginsberg.
Nevertheless, in many contexts, the ADA creates a force field
around indecendibility provisions in frequent flyer agreements. And as I
explain next, ISPs have made a similar argument with respect to the
inheritability of e-mails and other digital media.
2.

The Stored Communications Act

In 1986, Congress passed the SCA to extend privacy protections to
222
information stored on computer servers. ISPs claim that this antediluvian
federal statute prevents them from sharing a decedent’s electronic
communications with her personal representative. In this Subpart, I
critique that argument. In addition, because several jurisdictions and the
Uniform Law Commission have recently approved legislation that covers
similar terrain, I briefly discuss the uncharted issue of SCA preemption.
Some firms contend that the SCA bars them from releasing a
decedent’s online accounts. They cite § 2702 of the statute, which
223
imposes civil penalties upon ISPs that offer services to the public and
“knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
224
communication while in electronic storage by that service.” This
prohibition is not absolute, § 2702 exempts users who have given their
225
“lawful consent” to disclosure. Yet it is unclear what “lawful consent”
221. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998); see also supra text
accompanying notes 185190.
222. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. (1986); Orin S.
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide to Amending It,
72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1213 (2004). For specific discussions of the relationship between federal
and state law in this area, see Cahn, supra note 17, at 170618; James D. Lamm et al., The Digital
Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries From Managing Digital Property, 68
U. Miami L. Rev. 385, 40306 (2014); Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital Footprint Left Behind at Death: An
Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind, 74 La. L. Rev. 719, 750 (2014); Matt Borden,
Comment, Covering Your Digital Assets: Why the Stored Communications Act Stands in the Way of
Digital Inheritance, 75 Ohio St. L.J. 405, 41117 (2014).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2015); see also Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp.
1041, 1042–43 (N.D. Ill. 1998). This limitation means that most work-related or educational e-mail
accounts do not fall within § 2702. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 17, at 1734 n.33.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1); see also id. § 2707 (listing the damages for violation of the statute). In
addition to § 2702, trustees, executors, and administrators must contend with § 2701 of the SCA and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA). Id. § 1030. These provisions forbid unauthorized access to
e-mail accounts. For reasons that I have articulated elsewhere, and will not repeat here, I do not believe that
these statutes apply to fiduciaries. See Horton, supra note 17, at 173234.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).
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means. Moreover, even when the “lawful consent” exception has been
met, the SCA merely allows but does not require ISPs to allow access to
226
Thus, Facebook has opposed a personal
a decedent’s accounts.
representative’s request for a decedent’s files on the twin grounds that
“[i]t is unclear whether an administrator may lawfully consent to disclosure
of a deceased user’s communications” and that “disclosures under the
227
SCA are voluntary, not mandatory.” Likewise, Yahoo! has argued that
“there is no exception to the SCA’s prohibition on disclosure of
228
‘contents’ for an administrator.”
These arguments are only partially persuasive. Upon close inspection,
the scope of the SCA depends more on an ISP’s TOS than any other
factor. Consider decedents who either die intestate or do not mention
digital assets in their will or trust. The statute’s legislative history reveals
that these individuals can give “lawful consent” by signing up with an ISP
that authorizes disclosure:
If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of
an electronic communication service, and those rules are available to
users or in contracts for the provision of such services, it would be
appropriate to imply consent on the part of a user to disclosures or uses
229
consistent with those rules.

The fact that TOS can serve as the springboard for “lawful consent”
belies ISPs’ claims that they are constrained by § 2702. If they truly
wanted to make their customers’ electronic media inheritable, they could
easily accomplish that goal.
Similarly, TOS loom large even when a decedent addresses digital
assets in her estate plan. Suppose someone creates a will or a trust that
attempts to devise the contents of her online accounts, but her ISP’s TOS
contains an indescendibility provision. Arguably, the testator or settlor’s
directive is not “lawful consent” under § 2702. To be sure, she has
“consented” to release her data. But because her conduct defies the fine
230
print, it may not be “lawful.” And in any event, throwing off the
shackles of § 2702 only goes so far. As mentioned, the statute is a oneway street, if it governs, ISPs cannot disclose, but if it does not govern,

226. If a user satisfies the “lawful consent” element, the ISP “may divulge the contents of a
communication.” Id. § 2702(b)(3) (emphasis added).
227. Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena in a Civil Case at 6:4, 3:1415, In re Request for
Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (No. 5:12-mc-80171-LHK (PSG)).
228. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Yahoo! Inc. at 41 n.18, Ajemian v. Yahoo! Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (No. 2012-P-0178).
229. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 66 (1986).
230. Compare Benderson Dev. Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“To
breach a contract is not unlawful; the breach only begets a remedy in law or in equity.”), with Coats v.
Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 150 (Colo. App. 2013) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of
‘lawful’ is that which is ‘permitted by law.’” (citation omitted)).
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231

ISPs can still choose not to disclose. Once again, the company’s
descendibility policy is king.
The SCA’s impact on digital inheritance has led to a flurry of state
232
233
234
235
level reforms. Delaware, Connecticut, Indiana, Oklahoma, and
236
Rhode Island have all sought to regulate this nexus between technology
and death. Some of these statutes clarify that decedents “lawful[ly] consent”
237
to have their personal representative handle their digital assets, although
238
others are more equivocal. In addition, they create a process by which
personal representatives who are entitled to obtain the contents of a
decedent’s electronic accounts can send a written demand to the ISP
along with a death certificate, a probate court order, or a testamentary
239
instrument. And finally, they require ISPs to comply with such a
240
request.
In addition to these state laws, in July 2014, the Uniform Law
Commission approved the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets
241
Act (“UFADAA”). This draft statute allows fiduciaries to access the
contents of a decedent’s e-mail account “if the [ISP] is permitted to

231. See supra text accompanying note 204.
232. See Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a)(b) (2015).
233. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a (2015).
234. Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1 (2015).
235. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (2015).
236. R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-27-3 (2015).
237. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a); cf. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (“The executor or administrator
of an estate shall have the power, where otherwise authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or
terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social networking website, any microblogging or
short message service website or any e-mail service websites.”).
238. Two states’ laws declare that they do not “require [an ISP] to disclose any information . . . in
violation of any applicable federal law.” Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1(d)(1); see also Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 45a-334a(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an electronic mail service provider
to disclose any information in violation of any applicable federal law.”). By making themselves
subservient to the SCA, these statutes cannot be an independent grounds for finding “lawful consent”;
rather, they merely apply whenever § 2702 does not apply. There are also a few idiosyncratic state
laws. For instance, Nevada only allows personal representatives to “direct the termination of any account
of the decedent,” not to transmit an account in accordance with the decedent’s wishes. Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 143.188 (West 2015). Likewise, Virginia has a detailed law governing digital inheritance, but it
only covers “deceased minors.” Va. Code § 64.2-110 (2015).
239. See Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(c)(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a(b); Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1(b);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-27-3(1)(2).
240. See supra note 239. Several of these statutes contain cryptic references that could be construed
to allow a will, trust, or TOS to prohibit disclosure. For example, Delaware mandates release of the
contents of a decedent’s account “[u]nless otherwise provided by a governing instrument,” whatever
that means. Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, Oklahoma’s statute applies only
if disclosure is “otherwise authorized.” Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269.
241. Press Release, Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act
Approved (July 16, 2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform%
20Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets%20Act%20Approved.
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242

disclose” those materials under § 2702. Thus, unlike the SCA’s regime
of permissive release, the UFADAA requires ISPs to divulge stored data
243
when a fiduciary has the decedent’s blessing. Finally, the UFADAA
also contains a safety valve for privacy-conscious testators by allowing
them to declare in their wills that they want to prohibit access to their
244
electronic possessions.
These new and budding laws raise thorny federalism issues. To be
sure, the SCA neither contains an express preemption provision nor
245
evidences lawmakers’ intent to occupy the field. However, implied
preemption may be a different story. As is well-known, state legislation
must yield if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
246
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Unfortunately, there
is tension between some state digital asset statutes and the SCA’s chief
goals. As noted, the SCA aims to preserve the privacy of electronic
247
communications. This is not an idle concern: many people would
shudder at the thought of others rummaging through their online
248
correspondence. For this reason, the SCA embraces a default rule of
nondisclosure. Indeed, when both the user and an ISP’s TOS are silent,
249
Conversely, some jurisdictions make e-mails
§ 2702 kicks in.
250
presumptively descendible. Because this approach has the potential to
242. See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4 (2014), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014_UF
ADAA_Final.pdf [hereinafter UFADAA].
243. See id. § 8.
244. See id. § 4 (giving fiduciaries authority over digital property “[u]nless otherwise provided
. . . in the will of a decedent”).
245. The SCA contains language that seems, at first blush, to expressly preempt state law. Section
2708 states that “[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies
and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2015). Thus, in Quon
v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir 2008), rev’d sub. nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), a
California district court relied on this passage to hold that the SCA preempted state law invasion of
privacy claims against a police department for disclosing text messages. However, subsequent courts
have interpreted § 2708 not to be a preemption provision, but simply to clarify that the SCA does not
contain a Fourth Amendment-style exclusionary rule that can be invoked against the government. See
Bansal v. Russ, 513 F. Supp. 2d 264, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecom. Records
Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2007). In any event, the question of whether the SCA
precludes plaintiffs from asserting claims under state invasion of privacy laws has little bearing on
whether the statute forbids states from regulating the posthumous transmission of digital assets.
246. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
247. See supra text accompanying note 200.
248. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 17, at 1738; Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 175, at 117 (“More
than ever before, ‘ordinary people,’ leave digital relics which may be highly personal and intimate, and
are increasingly preserved and accessible in large volume after death.”).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 236238.
250. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(c)(d) (2015); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-27-3(1)(2) (2015).
Other state laws (and the UFADAA) go out of their way to avoid a conflict with the SCA. See supra
note 245 and text accompanying note 249.
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expose decedents to unwanted publicity, it is especially vulnerable to
implied obstacle preemption.
On the other hand, there is one context in which courts should
recognize that local law can trump the federal statute. Recall that the
SCA privileges an ISP’s indescendibility provision over a decedent’s
251
unambiguous attempt to convey her digital assets in her estate plan.
This aspect of the statute does not further Congress’s ambition of
shielding consumers from prying eyes. To the contrary, honoring the
noninheritability clause thwarts the decedent’s wish to share her electronic
media with her friends and family. Because this component of the SCA is
not necessary to effectuate the core congressional blueprint, state
legislatures should have the power to override it. And indeed, as noted
above, some have done so by deeming a bequest of digital assets to be
252
“lawful consent” to disclosure under § 2702. In addition, statutes such
as the UFADAA, which have been carefully tailored to avoid contradicting
the SCA, can go further. They can elevate a decedent’s express
command in her testamentary instruments to where it belongs: above the
sheer boilerplate that is a noninheritability provision.

Conclusion
Fine print has a new trick. Companies are encumbering propertyesque entitlements such as frequent flier miles and virtual assets with
indescendibility provisions. I have argued that courts should not always
defer to these contractually mandated life estates. First, some consumers
may reasonably believe that they have the right to convey these things to
their loved ones after death. Second, noninheritability clauses can lack
assent or violate principles of unconscionability or good faith and fair
dealing. And third, although federal law does create safe harbor for some
such terms, it does not immunize them all. We should not allow fine print
to swallow what the Supreme Court has called “one of the most essential
253
sticks in the bundle of rights.”

251. See supra text accompanying notes 237–238.
252. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (2015); R.I. Gen. Laws § 3327-3(1)(2).
253. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979)).
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